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A Strategic Imperative: 
Legal Representation of 
Unprivileged Enemy 
Belligerents in Status 
Determination 
Proceedings 
Kristine A. Huskey* 
Shortly before Geoff Corn was to present his article, Unprivileged Belligerents, Preventive 
Detention, and Fundamental Fairness: Rethinking the Review Tribunal Representation 
Model,1 which queries whether detainees should have counsel during procedures that 
determine if they qualify for indefinite detention, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 2012 or the Act) became law.2 The Act—criticized for its indefinite 
detention and mandatory military custody provisions3—also contains a lesser-known 
provision that permits an “unprivileged enemy belligerent” (UEB) who is in “long-term 
detention” pursuant to the laws of war to be “represented by military counsel at proceedings 
for the determination of status of the belligerent.”4 Accordingly, one must ask whether the 
recent legislation has superseded the Corn-Chickris article altogether. The answer is easily 
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 1. Geoffrey S. Corn & Peter A. Chickris, Unprivileged Belligerents, Preventive Detention, and 
Fundamental Fairness: Rethinking the Review Tribunal Representation Model, 11 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 99 (2012). 
 2. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 
 3. See, e.g., A Wrong Turn in Terror Fight, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/16/opinion/la-ed-defense-20111216; Charles C. Krulak & Joseph 
P. Hoar, Guantánamo Forever?, N.Y. TIMES (DEC. 12, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/opinion/guantanamo-forever.html. 
 4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 § 1024(b)(2). 
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“no” for two main reasons. First, the NDAA 2012 provision allowing detainees the ability to 
elect military counsel is a statutory grant and, therefore, could be restricted by future 
legislation or even repealed by the next year’s NDAA. Second, the article is simply an 
important read. It is a comprehensive and well-constructed analysis of United States’ 
detention law and policy as it has developed since September 11, 2001. This is no easy task as 
detention law and policy has been shifting dramatically ever since, sometimes in different 
directions, as a result of various actions taken by the three branches of government. In laying 
out such a comprehensive review, the article also provides a meaningful and necessary 
historical record, or narrative, of the last decade. 
The greater significance of the article, however, lies in the authors’ singularly strategic 
and practical approach—one rarely taken by legal scholars—to the question of the treatment 
of individuals detained in the “war on terror;”5 specifically, whether they should be provided 
legal representation during review tribunals that ultimately decide whether detention 
continues. As a former litigator who represented Guantanamo detainees for ten years, I have 
much appreciation for a tactical approach to the very vexing issues involved in detainee 
treatment, which encompasses not only whether detainees are being ill-treated or given 
reading materials, but what procedural protections they are receiving. Legal scholars often 
ask—not incorrectly—what rights do detainees have under domestic and/or international law 
which would entitle them to various types of treatment, rather than what “treatment” (i.e., 
due process) they should receive in order to protect the integrity of the detentions and provide 
the greatest benefit to all parties. Thus, the Corn-Chickris article contains no lengthy 
mulling-over of whether there is a constitutional right to legal representation or whether 
international humanitarian law provides some guarantee under conventions or customary 
international law. 
To the contrary, the authors pose the framing question as one driven by principle and 
practicality: “whether denying these captives legal representation is justified in light of the 
interests at stake in the detention review process.”6 From there, the authors quest to discern 
the fundamental fairness in allowing (or denying) legal representation during proceedings 
that determine whether the individual will be subject to long-term preventive detention. The 
Scottsboro case,7 Gideon v. Wainright,8 United States v. Salerno,9 and other Supreme Court 
opinions are discussed with the goal of looking closely at the meaning and effect of zealous 
representation and the theoretical foundations of the right to counsel. In this regard, the 
question is whether the underlying rationale in constitutional right-to-counsel cases is 
applicable, not as a matter of right but as one of analytical honesty, to long-term preventive 
detention cases. A more progressive way of looking at this would be to ask why some rights or 
protections in particular circumstances (e.g., incarceration) are considered “fundamental” and 
                                                                                                                               
 5. Individuals detained in the “war on terror” were referred to as “unlawful enemy combatants” during 
the Bush Administration and have been called “unprivileged enemy belligerents” during the Obama 
Administration. As discussed, neither term is necessarily limited to an individual picked up on an 
active or “hot” battlefield. See infra pp. 174–76. 
 6. Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 105. 
 7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  
 8. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
 9. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).  
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why, under the given rationale, any individual in similar circumstances, regardless of 
citizenship, should not have access to those rights or protections. Certainly citizenship, or lack 
thereof, does not make a right any less fundamental. In the case of the Guantanamo 
detainees in the pre-Boumediene era, the popular response to this type of question was that 
constitutional rights, such as habeas corpus, do not apply to non-citizens because only 
Americans (and legal residents) enjoy constitutional rights.10 Of course, this is a pro forma 
response and begs the question as to why certain constitutional rights are considered 
fundamental. 
In reviewing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the aforementioned counsel cases, Corn 
and Chickris get at the heart of this question without resorting to heavy-handed persuasion. 
The reader must inevitably deduce, as the authors do, that “[z]ealous representation thus 
represents something so closely related to due process as to be nearly inseparable.”11 The 
question of why due process is critical in the UEB status determination hearings is not 
answered as effortlessly, requiring much more than analysis of precedential caselaw, perhaps 
partly explaining the lengthy history of detention law and policy. The authors must 
necessarily proceed to addressing the question of insufficiency (in the case of denying counsel 
in status determination hearings) as part of the due process analysis. Lastly, while not 
essential to that analysis but relevant for the ultimate conclusion, the article takes on the 
question of feasibility (in the case of allowing counsel). In tying the two together—theoretical 
underpinnings and practical outcomes—the article achieves its overarching goal: effectively 
demonstrating the “strategic imperative” in allowing an individual access to counsel during a 
proceeding where the consequences involve a severe, if not lifelong, deprivation of liberty.12 
Drawing on the Corn-Chickris article, this Comment addresses the thorny question of why 
due process or, more specifically, legal representation, is critical in the status determination 
hearings of UEBs. I will first touch upon Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,13 highlighting some of the 
general circumstances and realities in the U.S. approach to al-Qaeda and related terrorism 
threats (otherwise known as the “war on terror”14), which must be taken into account, and 
                                                                                                                               
 10. See, e.g., Andrew C. McCarthy, The New Detainee Law Does Not Deny Habeas Corpus, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/218885/new-detainee-law-does-not-
deny-habeas-corpus/andrew-c-mccarthy#.  
 11. Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 138. 
 12. Though the Corn-Chickris article does not use the term “strategic imperative,” Corn opened his 
presentation at the 2012 Santa Clara Journal of International Law Symposium, Emerging Issues in 
International Humanitarian Law, by framing the legal representation issue as one of “strategic 
imperative.” This term seems very fitting as it connotes both a sense of operational necessity in the 
status hearings and crucial, longer-term objectives relating to U.S. interests in the “war on terror.” 
 13. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).  
 14. During the Bush Administration, this “engagement” was referred to as the GWOT or Global War on 
Terror. For many years, I despised the term because the mere phrase was used to invoke fear and 
provide justification to the American public for using only the advantageous portions of the laws of 
armed conflict (LOAC). In early 2009, the Obama Administration decided it would not use the 
“GWOT” phrase, opting for something more technical. Obama Scraps ‘Global War on Terror’ for 
‘Overseas Contingency Operation,’ FOXNEWS (Mar. 25, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/03/25/obama-scraps-global-war-terror-overseas-contingency-
operation/. By 2009, however, the “war on terror” language had become fairly commonplace; now, it 
seems to be no longer used derisively by those who had previously done so with reference to the 
“GWOT,” including myself. Despite its 2009 edict, the Obama Administration frequently uses “war” 
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then address specific considerations that arise in these types of status determinations, which 
also indicate the need for legal representation. 
Hamdi, Changed Circumstances, and Current Realities 
As discussed in the article, the legal foundation for the preventive detention of enemy 
combatants/belligerents by the United States lies primarily in Ex parte Quirin15 (a World 
War II case), and in the more recent post-9/11 case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.16 Indeed, Hamdi 
serves as the legal grounding for the now commonly asserted proposition by lower courts and 
commentators alike that preventive/indefinite detention by the military of suspected 
terrorists in the “war on terror” is a permissible incident to war.17 The Hamdi Court, 
however, was validating only the legality of preventive detention of the individual in the 
“narrow” category before it: “[A]n individual who . . . was ‘ “part of or supporting forces hostile 
to the United States or coalition partners” ’ in Afghanistan and who ‘ “engaged in an armed 
conflict against the United States” ’ there.”18 Moreover, by “engaged in an armed conflict,” the 
Court was referring to the fact that Hamdi had been bearing arms as part of a Taliban 
military unit and was on a battlefield in Afghanistan.19 As noted and well-demonstrated by 
Corn and Chickris, the United States—through court decisions and executive action—has 
extended the scope of detention authority well beyond the definition endorsed in Hamdi. 
Certainly, the Court explicitly left it up to the lower courts to “elaborate” upon the definition 
of the term, “enemy combatant;” that is, to define the permissible bounds of the category of 
who could be lawfully detained.20 Yet, the article fails to note that the Hamdi Court also 
recognized the existence of some outer limit, restricting just how far that definition could be 
extended. 
The Court first recognized the government’s position that the detention of Hamdi in the 
“war on terror” could be lifelong.21 This recognition was not to put its imprimatur on 
                                                                                                                               
language to justify military action against al-Qaeda, terrorists, and “stateless enemies.” See Att’y 
Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at Northwestern University School of Law 
(Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html; 
John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, The Ethics and 
Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the 
Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for Scholars (Apr. 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/brennans-speech-counterterrorism-april-2012/p28100. 
 15. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 16. 542 U.S. 507. 
 17. See id. at 518; see also Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (D.S.C. 2005); Thomas F. Powers, 
When to Hold ’Em: The U.S. Should Detain Suspected Terrorists—Even If It Can’t Make a Case 
against Them in Court, LEGAL AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 21, available at 
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2004/argument_powers_sepoct04.msp. 
 18. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
 19. Id. at 517–18. 
 20. Id. at 522 n.1. 
 21. Id. at 520. In considering Hamdi’s complaint about the indefinite nature of his detention and the 
government’s response that detentions of enemy combatants during World War II were similarly 
indefinite, the Court stated: 
We take Hamdi’s objection to be not to the lack of certainty regarding the date on which the 
conflict will end, but to the substantial prospect of perpetual detention. We recognize that 
the national security underpinnings of the “war on terror,” although crucially important, are 
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indefinite preventive detention in an “unconventional war,” but rather to provide a 
potentially contrasting scenario to its limited holding. In concluding that the congressional 
grant of authority to use force under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)22 
includes the authority to detain, the Court addressed at length the limiting circumstances: 
[O]ur understanding is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the practical 
circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed 
the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel. But that is not the 
situation we face as of this date. Active combat operations against Taliban fighters 
apparently are ongoing in Afghanistan. The United States may detain, for the duration 
of these hostilities, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants who 
“engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.” If the record establishes that 
United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those 
detentions are part of the exercise of “necessary and appropriate force,” and therefore 
are authorized by the AUMF.23 
The Court emphasized two key and interdependent points: (1) its holding was based on 
law-of-war principles informed by traditional armed conflicts; and (2) it was authorizing 
indefinite detention in an armed conflict with the hallmarks of a traditional armed conflict—
“active combat operations” with troops on the ground, on a battlefield in a specific 
geographical location. The Court’s conclusion—that its understanding of preventive detention 
would unravel if the practical circumstances were unlike those in a traditional armed 
conflict—is often overlooked by courts, commentators, and scholars. Would the Hamdi Court 
conclude today that its understanding of detention had “unraveled”? This author submits that 
it has become undone or, in the least, that the Hamdi law-of-war principles with respect to 
preventive detention are not nearly as applicable in the current U.S. engagement with al-
Qaeda and related terrorist threats.24 
There are significant factors in support of this proposition. Since Hamdi was decided in 
2004, it has become increasingly patent that there are no temporal or geographical 
boundaries in the “war on terror.” Most obviously, there will not be a peace treaty with al-
Qaeda or associated forces ending the “war,” and it is unlikely that the United States would 
ever consider terrorism (of the kind driven by Islamic extremists) eliminated entirely. The 
lack of a geographical restriction, which was present in Hamdi, is illustrated by some of the 
Guantanamo habeas cases and the well-known Bagram detention case, Al Maqaleh v. 
                                                                                                                               
broad and malleable. As the Government concedes, “given its unconventional nature, the 
current conflict is unlikely to end with a formal cease-fire agreement.” The prospect Hamdi 
raises is therefore not farfetched. If the Government does not consider this unconventional 
war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if 
released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken 
throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest 
of his life. 
 Id. (citations omitted).  
 22. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 23. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 (citations omitted). 
 24. See generally Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too 
Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169 (2011); Kristine A. Huskey, Guantanamo and Beyond: Reflections on 
the Past, Present, and Future of Preventive Detention, 9 UNIV. N.H. L. REV. 183, 201–05 (2011). 
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Gates,25 all litigated well after Hamdi. In those cases, the detainees were captured in places 
far from Afghanistan, such as Bosnia, Mauritania, and Thailand, and brought to military 
detention centers in Guantanamo and Afghanistan.26 Additionally, the drone strikes in 
Pakistan and Yemen, together with the recent speech by Attorney General Eric Holder, 
further confirm the United States’ position that no geographical limitation exists with respect 
to the armed conflict against al-Qaeda and associated forces.27 Lastly, in the eyes of many, 
including some influential congressional leaders, this “battlefield” extends to even inside the 
United States. Senator Lindsey Graham was heard to say on the floor of the Senate during 
the debate over the recent National Defense Authorization Act that “[t]he enemy is all over 
the world,” including “[h]ere at home.”28 
Additionally, exactly who falls into the category of unprivileged enemy belligerent, that is, 
who can be detained, is and always has been a fairly broad and vague category. As detailed in 
the Corn-Chickris article, the definition of “unlawful enemy combatant”/“unprivileged enemy 
belligerent” has gone through several, though similar, variations since 9/11.29 Most recently, 
Congress set forth the definition of who can be preventively (and indefinitely) detained 
pursuant to the laws of war as including “person[s] who [were] a part of or substantially 
supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.”30 This 
                                                                                                                               
 25. 604 F.Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 26. See, e.g., Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 750 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Mauritania); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 
F.3d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Bosnia); Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (Thailand). 
 27. See Robert Naiman, Could We Stop ‘Signature’ Drone Strikes in Yemen and Pakistan?, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-naiman/drones-yemen_b_1458668.html. 
See also Holder, supra note 14. Specifically, Holder asserted: 
In response to the attacks perpetrated—and the continuing threat posed—by al Qaeda, the 
Taliban, and associated forces, Congress has authorized the President to use all necessary 
and appropriate force against those groups. Because the United States is in an armed 
conflict, we are authorized to take action against enemy belligerents under international 
law. The Constitution empowers the President to protect the nation from any imminent 
threat of violent attack. And international law recognizes the inherent right of national self-
defense. None of this is changed by the fact that we are not in a conventional war. 
Our legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan. Indeed, neither 
Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to 
the current conflict in Afghanistan. We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting 
operations from country to country. 
 Id. 
 28. Michael McAuliff & Jennifer Bendery, Senate Votes to Let Military Detain Americans Indefinitely, 
White House Threatens Veto, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/29/senate-votes-to-let-military-detain-americans-
indefinitely_n_1119473.html. During the floor debate, Senator Kelly Ayotte made a similar 
statement: “America is part of the battlefield.” Matt Taibbi, Indefinite Detention of American 
Citizens: Coming Soon to Battlefield U.S.A., ROLLING STONE (Dec. 9, 2011), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/indefinite-detention-of-american-citizens-coming-
soon-to-battlefield-u-s-a-20111209. 
 29. See Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 121–26, 129–30.  
 30. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(a), (b), 125 
Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). Additionally, under § 1021, persons can be detained “who planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided . . . or harbored those responsible” for the attacks occurring on 
September 11, 2001. Id. 
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definition is essentially the same one the D.C. District and Circuit Courts have been using 
since Boumediene31 to put the “flesh” on the Hamdi “bones.”32 
While the contours continue to be developed and the courts identify particular factors that 
implicate membership in al-Qaeda, such as staying at guests’ houses and training camps, one 
thing is certain: every individual “captured” or picked up for detention purposes (or targeted 
for killing) was dressed as a civilian. Indeed, that the Guantanamo detainees were 
“indistinguishable” from civilians was one factor, among others, relied upon by the Bush 
Administration to deny them legal protections under the Geneva Conventions, including 
denying an Article 5 hearing to determine their status in the first place.33 As it turned out, 
many individuals picked up and detained at Guantanamo and elsewhere were, in fact, 
civilians and not combatants.34 It would, of course, be unrealistic to expect the military (and 
even the CIA) to make precision “captures” or not to err on the side of caution in picking up 
individuals suspected of engaging in or supporting hostilities against the United States. But, 
it is worth noting that the point of status determinations is to mitigate the effects of this 
approach. 
The “dressed as civilians” factor, the expansive and vague category of who can be detained, 
and the absence of temporal and geographical limitations are not discussed here to argue in 
favor of eliminating preventive detention altogether. Though arguably, these three factors 
have moved far from the circumstances presented in Hamdi such that preventive detention 
under current circumstances might not be sanctioned by the Hamdi Court. Hamdi aside, 
these current realities simply demonstrate a need for greater due process in order to reach an 
accurate determination. As fully developed in the Corn-Chickris article, legal representation 
during the status determination hearings is one such necessary due process protection. The 
analogy to Article 5 tribunal hearings in the Geneva Conventions and the limited procedural 
protections therein is a false one, not merely due to the “definitional uncertainty” in the scope 
of detention authority, as pointed out by the authors, but also due to the expanded nature of 
the “armed conflict” against al-Qaeda and associated forces. This is not to say that the 
Geneva Conventions are “quaint” and “obsolete”35 but rather to suggest that the 
                                                                                                                               
 31. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 32. Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 119. 
 33. See Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on the 
Geneva Convention (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/38727.htm. See also John 
Bellinger, Unlawful Enemy Combatants, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 17, 2007, 7:01 AM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2007/01/17/unlawful-enemy-combatants; Response of the United States to 
Request for Precautionary Measures—Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, Apr. 15, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 1015, 1023 (2002). 
 34. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008); El-Masri v. 
United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Michael Luciano, Guantanamo Bay is Still 
Open, and Barack Obama is Still Assaulting the Bill of Rights, POLICYMIC (May 2012), 
http://www.policymic.com/articles/8047/guantanamo-bay-is-still-open-and-barack-obama-is-still-
assaulting-the-bill-of-rights; Andy Worthington, Guantánamo Habeas Results: The Definitive List, 
http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/guantanamo-habeas-results-the-definitive-list/ (last visited Aug. 
11, 2012). 
 35. Draft Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to the President of the 
United States 2 (Jan. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf (under the subject “Decision re 
application of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war to the conflict with al Qaeda and the 
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understanding under traditional law-of-war principles with respect to legal representation 
has similarly “unraveled.” Ultimately, the aforementioned factors have not only changed the 
“armed conflict” such that the application of preventive detention under Hamdi is somewhat 
limited, but they also present practical circumstances that must factor into the due process 
analysis. 
The Combatant Status Review Tribunals—A Comparison 
Established by the Department of Defense as administrative proceedings in direct 
response to the Supreme Court opinions in Rasul v. Bush36 and Hamdi, the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)37 held at Guantanamo provide an excellent point of 
comparison to the detainee review tribunals38 operating in Afghanistan. While there is some 
divergence between the two procedures, which will be discussed below, many features of the 
detainee review tribunals were and are still similar to the CSRTs, including, to wit, the use of 
a personal representative—the nonlawyer representative assigned to assist the detainee with 
his status determination hearing.39 
The Importance of Boumediene 
The starting point is Boumediene, in which the Supreme Court starkly criticized the 
CSRTs, finding that, “even when all the parties involved in this process act with diligence and 
in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact.”40 
Specifically, the Court compared the procedural protections afforded the Eisentrager41 
petitioners to those provided to detainees in their CSRTs, pointing out that the detainee’s 
personal representative was neither his lawyer nor his advocate.42 Further, despite its 
assertion that it would not revisit Yamashita and Quirin, the Court later noted that General 
                                                                                                                               
Taliban,” the President’s counsel proposes that the war on terrorism “renders obsolete Geneva’s 
strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions”). 
 36. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 37. Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., 
to Gordon R. England, Sec’y of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
 38. The proceedings used to determine the status of detainees in Afghanistan have changed names over 
the last ten years. This Commentary will use “detainee review tribunal” to refer generally to the 
status determination proceedings that have occurred and are presently occurring in Afghanistan, 
unless specifically noted otherwise.  
 39. See Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 151–52.  
 40. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).  
 41. In Johnson v. Eisentrager (a WWII case), petitioners were German soldiers who, after having been 
tried by military commissions and convicted outside the United States, petitioned a U.S. court for 
habeas corpus. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). The Supreme Court concluded they had no right of habeas, 
relying, in part, on the “enemy alien” status of the Germans and the lack of sovereignty over the 
territory in which they had been captured, tried and were being held. Id. at 777–78. Eisentrager has 
been oft-cited by the government, courts and commentators for the proposition that enemy aliens, 
unlawful enemy combatants, and/or unlawful enemy belligerents have no right of habeas when 
detained in locations over which the U.S. has no sovereignty. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762–
65; Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 990–92 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Brief for the Respondents in 
Opposition, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334), available at 
http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-334/03-334.resp.html.  
 42. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767. 
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Yamashita was represented by six military lawyers who demonstrated skill, resourcefulness, 
and zeal for his defense and that counsel had been appointed to the German saboteurs in 
Quirin.43 The Court ultimately concluded that the CSRT procedures were more limited than 
those in Eisentrager and fell “well short” of adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the 
need for habeas.44 
On the one hand, the Court’s reference to the criminal trials, which are adversarial in 
nature, could be read to infer that CSRTs and detainee review tribunals need not contain the 
same procedural protections (e.g., legal representation) because they are administrative 
hearings and not adversarial in nature.45 To some degree, Corn and Chickris appear to be 
making this suggestion in noting that while General Yamashita and the Quirin defendants 
received counsel, their proceedings were adversarial and, in contrast, Boumediene’s CSRT 
was not.46 Further, the authors refrain from delving into what the Boumediene Court was 
conveying when it twice raised the existence of counsel and adversarial nature of the criminal 
proceedings in juxtaposition to the CSRTs. Rather than suggesting that non-adversarial 
proceedings do not require counsel, the Court was proposing that the CSRTs were inadequate 
because they were a far cry from an adversarial process with the attendant procedural 
protections. Indeed, in comparing the Guantanamo detainees to the Eisentrager defendants, 
the Court pointed out that: 
They have been afforded some process in CSRT proceedings to determine their status; 
but, unlike in Eisentrager, there has been no trial by military commission for violations 
of the laws of war. The difference is not trivial. The records from the Eisentrager trials 
suggest that, well before the petitioners brought their case to this Court, there had been 
a rigorous adversarial process to test the legality of their detention . . . . To rebut the 
accusations, they were entitled to representation by counsel, allowed to introduce 
evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's 
witnesses.47 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Boumediene Court would find fault with 
the positive emphasis placed by some on the non-adversarial nature of the detainee review 
tribunals in Afghanistan.48 
                                                                                                                               
 43. Id. at 786–87. 
 44. Id. at 767. 
 45. See generally Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to 
Legitimacy, ARMY LAW., June 2010, at 9. Bovarnick goes to great lengths to emphasize the non-
adversarial nature of the detainee review boards in Afghanistan seemingly to suggest that the 
detainees have little need for procedural protections. Id. at 22, 30. Further, in response to criticism 
that the detainee’s personal representative is a nonlawyer, he also argues that the laws of war 
applicable to the U.S. conflict in Afghanistan, implemented by Army Regulation 190-8, do not 
require lawyers. Id. at 39, 42. Corn and Chickris deftly counter this rationale in their article. See 
Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 145–49.  
 46. Corn & Chickris, supra note 1, at 153 n.195 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767, 787). 
 47. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766–67 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 48. As mentioned above, Bovarnick seems to herald the detainee review boards’ non-adversarial nature 
as an advantage to the detainee, or at least as a neutral factor, as well as a formal justification that 
legal representation is not necessary. See supra note 45. Additionally, despite the proclamations 
that the detainee review boards are non-adversarial, they in fact have a number of characteristically 
“adversarial” features, such as the ability of the recorder to cross-examine and re-cross the detainee 
and the opportunity for rebuttal. Bovarnick, supra note 45, at 23, 30.  
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (2012) 
178 
Indeed, in reviewing those early detainee review tribunals in Afghanistan, the D.C. Circuit 
in Maqaleh cited to the above passage in Boumediene, noting the importance the Supreme 
Court gave to the adversarial nature of the Eisentrager proceedings and the lack thereof in 
the CSRTs.49 The D.C. Circuit went on to find that the Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review 
Boards “afford[ed] even less protection to the rights of detainees in the determination of 
status than was the case with the CSRT,” and therefore, the important adequacy of process 
factor more strongly favored the petitioners before them than those in Boumediene.50 Thus, 
the lack of protections given a detainee in the initial status determination weighed in favor of 
a more adversarial process with procedural protections in a subsequent process that similarly 
tests the legality of detention. 
It could be argued that it is only when a habeas right is implicated that the process need 
be rigorously adversarial, replete with legal representation and other procedural protections. 
To do so might be appropriate if it was purely a question of legal right, but it would ignore the 
underlying tenet regarding status determinations in Boumediene and Maqaleh. That is, the 
less adversarial the process used for testing the legality of the detention and the larger the 
deficit in protections such as access to counsel, the greater the need for habeas in order to 
reach an accurate result.51 Rather than make a detainee’s legal right to habeas the 
contingent factor, the Corn-Chickris article proposes to endow the initial underlying status 
determination procedures with the hallmarks of due process in habeas proceedings or, in the 
very least, to allow the detainee access to legal representation in order to reach the most 
accurate result. 
Some Practical Considerations 
Comparing the CSRTs to the detainee status review tribunals also offers some practical 
insights into the ultimate, strategic question of whether denying these captives legal 
representation is justified in light of the interests at stake in the detention review process.52 
Several features of the two tribunals are similar, including the fact that in neither procedure 
does the detainee have access to a legal representative; rather, he is assigned a “personal 
representative” (PR). The Corn-Chickris article spends ample time demonstrating why 
                                                                                                                               
 49. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Additionally, the pre-Boumediene cases filed in the D.C. Circuit Court pursuant to the Detainee 
Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005 were not habeas cases, nor was there any intent by Congress to 
fashion the DTA review procedures like habeas procedures. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 778. In 
those DTA review cases, however, the detainees were presumed to have access to counsel—not just 
so that counsel could file petitions in federal court, but meaningful access. Moreover, the D.C. 
Circuit highlighted the importance of counsel in these non-habeas cases, emphasizing the need for 
“ ‘full and frank communication’ between a detainee and his counsel” and stating: “[w]e cannot 
discharge [our] responsibility under the DTA, particularly [our] responsibility to determine whether 
a preponderance of the evidence supports the Tribunal’s determination, unless a petitioner’s counsel 
has access to as much as is practical of the classified information regarding his client.” Bismullah v. 
Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 187, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 52. Many of these related points I initially raised at the Emerging Issues in International Humanitarian 
Law symposium have been incorporated into the current version of the main article and, 
accordingly, I will only touch upon them briefly here as a means of highlighting the most relevant 
concerns. 
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zealous representation, which is integral to due process, can only be carried about by legal 
counsel, not by a lay representative. In contrast, one commentator presents a well-argued 
case for why a lay representative in the current detainee review tribunals is able to 
adequately assist the detainee in meaningfully challenging his detention.53 For example, 
since July 2009, the PR has been required to “act in the best interests of the detainee”54 and, 
since July 2010, the PR is bound by a non-disclosure policy not to communicate information 
gleaned from discussions with the detainee or discovered independently that might be 
detrimental to the detainee’s case.55 These two significant features were not part of the CSRT 
procedures. However, the proof is in the proverbial pudding. In comparing two separate 
reports (both of which include case studies) of the two processes, the complaints by the 
detainees about the PR are eerily similar.56 Though the “best interests” and “non-disclosure 
policy” features are somewhat new and arguably need to be “given a chance,” both had been 
part of the procedures when human rights monitors observed detainee review tribunals in 
Afghanistan.57 Moreover, the common complaint about the PRs in the case of the detainee 
review tribunals in Afghanistan was not that the PRs disclosed adverse detainee 
communications, but that the PRs regularly failed to ask questions of the detainee at the 
hearing and offer independent evidence that was easily accessible.58 Notably, the 
requirement that the PR “act in the best interest of the detainee” has been a feature of the 
detainee review tribunals since 2009 and, yet, it has not seemed to change the general 
behavior of the PR from the time the policy was first instituted in 2009 to status hearings in 
2011.59 More importantly, the nature of these complaints are very similar to the complaints 
that many detainees made about their PRs in the CSRTs60—the same CSRTs roundly 
                                                                                                                               
 53. See generally Bovarnick, supra note 45, at 23, 30. 
 54. Policy Guideline on Detainee Review Procedures at Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF), 
Afghanistan (U), enclosed in Letter from Phillip Carter, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Detainee 
Policy, to Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman of the Senate Armed Servs. Comm. (July 14, 2009) (filed as 
addendum to Brief for Respondents-Appellants, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (2010) 
(No. 09-5266), 2009 WL 6043972.  
 55. Declaration of Vice Admiral Robert S. Harward at ¶ 11 (attached to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction, Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 06-CV-01669 (D.D.C. May 19, 2011)), available at 
https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=aWpuZXR3b3JrLm9yZ3xiYWdyYW0tcHVibGl
jLWxpYnJhcnl8Z3g6NmEwZGVjZWQ1Njg1NWU2. 
 56. See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS—CSRT: THE MODERN HABEAS 
CORPUS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNALS AT GUANTÁNAMO 3, 4, 6 (2006), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf; DAPHNE 
EVIATAR, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DETAINED AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO MAKE U.S. 
DETENTION COMPLY WITH THE LAW 13–16 (Gabor Rona et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter DETAINED AND 
DENIED], available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/Detained-Denied-in-
Afghanistan.pdf. See generally Kristine A. Huskey, Standards and Procedures for Classifying 
“Enemy Combatants”: Congress, What Have You Done?, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 46–50 (2007) 
(providing case examples of deficiencies in CSRT hearings).  
 57. DETAINED AND DENIED, supra note 56, at About this Report (prologue). 
 58. Id. at 14–16. In addition to observing detainee review boards, Human Rights First interviewed 
eighteen detainees from late-2010 and early-2011, all of whom had been released within the 
previous year. Id. at About this Report (prologue). 
 59. Id. at 13.  
 60. Based on interviews with the author’s former clients, who were detained at Guantanamo at the 
time. 
11 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169 (2012) 
180 
criticized by the Supreme Court and which proved to be a poor process for making accurate 
status determinations. 
These case studies perhaps prove the Corn-Chickris point better than any constitutional 
case: only legal counsel can genuinely “act in the best interest” of the detainee and, therefore, 
provide the zealous representation crucial to due process. 
*   *   * 
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2012 gives all detainees held in long-term 
detention pursuant to the laws of war the statutory right to counsel, even those for whom 
habeas may not be a right. Despite the fact that this right could be restricted in 
implementation, it does tend to legitimize the initial status determination process for all of 
the reasons set forth above—particularly both Hamdi and Boumediene pointing toward more, 
rather than less, protections given current circumstances in the conflict with al-Qaeda. Such 
protections, to include legal representation, would make a secondary process, such as habeas, 
perhaps less necessary for reaching accurate status determinations. And this seems to be the 
point of the article; that there is “strategic imperative”—a need driven by principles and 
practicalities and not contingent on a legal right—in affording more than a small measure of 
due process in proceedings which could result in the lifelong deprivation of liberty for an 
innocent person. 
